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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16945

-vsMARC CHESNUT,
Defendant-Appellant.

------

.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with theft in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (Supp. 1973), for the obtaining
or exercising unauthorized control of another's motorcycle
with a purpose to deprive them thereof.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty
on September 19, 1979, in the District Court of Utah County,
the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, presiding.

The appellant

was sentenced February 22, 1979, to be confined in the Utah
State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed five
years.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment of the jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the summer of 1979, Marc Chesnut was twenty-two
and Kenny Covington was twenty.

They lived a few houses

from each other in Lehi, Utah (T.51).

Mr. Covington owned

a motorcycle which he had purchased for $1,650

(T.27).

On June 27, 1979, at 2:45 a.m. Officer Carl
Zirrunerman, of the Lehi Police Department, observed
appellant pushing a motorcycle down the road towards
his home.

The officer pulled along side the appellant and

asked whose motorcycle it was

(T.10).

Appellant responded

that it belonged to Kenny Covington (T.10).

When asked

what he intended to do, appellant said he intended to ride
it in a nearby vacant lot (T.10).

The motorcycle was a

dirt bike that did not require a key (T.10).
The officer knew both the appellant and
Covington.

After talking to appellant, Officer Zimmerman

went to Mr. Covington's house and aroused him from his
sleep (T.11).

Covington told the officer he had not

given appellant permission to ride his bike that night (T.29).
During this conversation, appellant pleaded with Covington
to give him a break (T.21 and 29).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Officer Zinunerman called Officer Evans to
assist him. Officer Evans arrested appellant and took
him to the county jail (T.22).

In the presence of

Officer Evans and Deputy Yance Horne, appellant stated
that he had taken the bike because Mr. Covington owed
him $300.

Appellant denies making this statement.

Covington testified that when the theft occurred he
owed the appellant $100.
During cross-examination, the defense counsel
tried to

elicit from Covington what his motive was in

testifying (T.37).

Covington had been involved in a

separate, unrelated, criminal investigation which
occurred after appellant took his bike(T.44).
Evans had made this investigation (T.37).

Officer

Defense

counsel tried to show that Officer Evans had coached
Covington on his testimony (T.38).

When Covington

testified that no one told him how to testify, the court
did not allow defense counsel to pursue this line of
questioning further (T.42).
Appellant claims he was pushing the bike to his
house to get some gas because the bike was empty (T.55).
Covington testified that there was gas in the bike (T.66).
The defendant made a motion to dismiss after
the state's case claiming that the state's evidence was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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insufficient to prove the element of intent.
was denied

(T.47).

also denied (T.67).

The motion

A motion for a directed verdict was
The court, over defendant's objection,

refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense
of joyriding (T.70). On September 19, 1979, appellant was
found guilty as charged.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE PROVED THE CORPUS DELECTI OF
THE CRIME OF THEFT.
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-404

(1953), as amended,

states:
A person commits theft if he obtains
or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose
to deprive him thereof.
The appellant's only contention is that the
state failed to show by "clear and convincing evidence,"
independent of the defendant's own confession, that
the appellant intended to permanently deprive Mr.
Covington of his motorcycle, and therefore the state
failed to establish the corpus delecti of the crime of
theft.

Utah case law does not support this contention.
In State v. Cazier, 521 P.2d 554

(Utah 1974), this

Court defines corpus delecti as " . . . the body of the crime;
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and that as it is used in regard to proof of crime, it
refers only to evidence that a crime has been committed."
1
Id. at 555.
The Court also said, referring to prior Utah
cases which the defendant had cited, that:
We see nothing in those cases to
support the idea that the corpus
delecti includes all the elements of
a crime.
Id. at 555.
In State v. Atin, 203 Kan. 920, 457 P.2d 89
defendant was convicted of larceny.

(1969), the

On Appeal he asserted

that the state had failed to establish the corpus delecti.
The Kansas Supreme Court defined the corpus delecti as:
The corpus delecti of larceny is
consisted of two elements:
(1) that the
property was lost by the owner; and (2)
that it was lost by a feloneous taking.
Id. at 95.
This Court in State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175 (Utah
1977), stated the necessary requirements to establish the
corpus delecti:

1

Black's Law Dictionary defines the corpus delecti
as:
"The body of a crime.
. In a derivative
sense, the substance as foundation of a crime; the
substantial fact that a crime has been committed."
Black's Law Dictionary 413 (4th ed. 1968).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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An admission or a confession, without
some independent corroborative evidence of
the corpus delicti, cannot alone support a
guilty verdict.
To sustain a conviction,
the requirement of independent proof of the
corpus delicti requires only that the
State present evidence that the injury
specified in the crime occurred, and that
such injury was caused by someone's criminal
conduct. An admission or confession is
admissible to connect an accused with the
crime cormnitted; but the connection of the
accused with the crime need not be proven to
establish the corpus delicti.
Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
In the instant case the State established the
corpus delicti for theft.

Officer Zimmerman's testimony

showed (1) that the act specified in the crime occurred-the obtaining or exercising of unauthorized control over
the motorcycle (T.10); and (2) that someone was
criminally responsible--that the motorcycle was taken
by the appellant (T.10).
This Court in State v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 275
P.2d 173 (1954), stated the standard for establishing the
corpus delecti was "clear and convincing evidence,"
independent of the defendant's testimony.
The rationale behind the corpus delecti rule is
to assure that a crime has been committed.
Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 314 P.2d 353

In State v.

(1957), this Court

emphasized that "the rule should be applied with caution
and not permitted to be used as a technical obstruction

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the administration of justice."

314 P.2d at 356.

In the instant case, there was clear and convincing
evidence, independent of the appellant's admission
that a motorcycle had been stolen, which established
the corpus delecti.

There is no requirement that. the

state prove the defendant's intent to establish the
corpus delecti.

Such a requirement is contrary to State

v. Knoefler and State v. Cazier, supra.
POINT II
THE STATE ESTABLISHED BY SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT TOOK THE
MOTORCYCLE WITH THE INTENT TO
PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE THE OWNER THEREOF.
The appellant was convicted of theft, in
violation of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-404

(1953), as amended,

in that he "did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over
the property of Kenny Covington with the purpose to deprive
the owner thereof. . . . "

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1953),

as amended, defines "purpose to deprive" as having the
"conscious object":
(a) To withhold property permanently
or for so extended a period or to use under
such circumstances that a substantial portion
of its economic value or of the use and
benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon
payment of a reward or other compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that
the owner will recover it.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The appellant argues that the State has failed
to prove the requisite element of intent.

In State v.

Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292, 422 P.2d 196 (1967), this Court
warned:
Defendant's case is presented in
the all-too-common manner of defense
counsel!
arguing from his own theory
of the evidence that it does not show
the necessary intent to justify the
verdict.
But this is at variance with
the correct pattern of procedure on
appeal and paints quite a different
picture of this case than we are
obliged to see.
It is our duty to
respect the prerogative of the jury
as the exclusive judges of the
credibility of the witnesses and as
the determiners of the facts.
Consequently, we assume that they believed
the state's evidence, and we survey it,
together with all fair inferences that
the jury could reasonably draw therefrom,
in the light most favorable to their
verdict.
422 P.2d at 197.
In State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 486, 359 P.2d 486
1961),

this Court rejected the defendant's contention that

the prosecution had not proven his intent to burglarize an
apartment.

The Court held:
It is to be remembered that intent,
being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible
of direct proof.
But it can be inferred
from conduct and attendant circumstances
in the light of human experience.

359 P.2d at 487.

Accord:

State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(U~

218

(Utah 1976)

("The intent to steal or unlawfully deprive

the rightful owners of their property can be inferred by
defendant's conduct and the attendant circumstances
testified to by the witnesses,"); State v. Canfield, supra
at 198 (".

.

[W] e are aware of no better nor persuasive

way to do it (prove what a man intended) than by showing
both what he did and what he said . . . . ").
In the instant case the appellant's purpose in
taking the motorcycle was shown from his actions and what
he said.

The appellant was apprehended at 2:45 a.m. while

pushing his neighbor's motorcycle down the street (T.10).
His neighbor had not given him permission to take the
bike (T.29), yet he pleaded with the neighbor to give him
a break (T.21).
This was a dirt bike, which started without a
key (T.10).

There was gas in the bike (T.66), enough

that Mr. Chesnut did not need to push the bike
silently down the road.
business area

The area was a residential

(T.14).

Finally Officer Evans testified that Mr. Chesnut
told him he took the bike because Mr. Covington owed him
$300

(T.23).

Mr. Covington verified that he did owe the

appellant money

(T.30).

It is the respondent's position

that there was sufficient evidence to prove the defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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had the purpose to permanently deprive the owner of the
motorcycle.
In State v. Romero, supra, the defendant appealed
his conviction for burglary and theft, claiming there was
insufficient evidence to uphold his conviction.

He based

his claim upon the fact that the witnesses could not identify
all the co-defendants and gave conflicting testimony about
the circumstances of the crime.

This Court rejected his

appeal and held:
This court has long upheld the standard
that on an appeal from conviction the court
cannot weigh the evidence nor say what
quantum is necessary to establish a fact
beyond a reasonable doubt so long as the
evidence given is substantial.
Further, this
court has maintained that its function is not
to determine guilt or innocence, the weight to
give conflicting evidence, the credibility
of witnesses, or the weight to be given
defendant's testimony.
Id. at 218

(citations omitted).

This Court continued:

This court has set the standard for
determining sufficiency of evidence to require
that it be so inconclusive or so inherently
improbable that reasonable minds could not
reasonably believe defendant committed a crime.
Unless there is a clear showing of lack of
evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld.
Id. at 219

(citations omitted).

Accord:

State v. Mills,

530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975).
The appellant has not shown that the evidence
presented at trial was so inherently improbable that this

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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court should decide as a matter of law that the defendant
did not have the requisite intent.
POINT III
THE APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF THEFT
OF AN OPERATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE AND THE TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF JOYRIDING.
In State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175

(1976),

this Court stated the standard to be used for determining
when a trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on
a lesser included offense:
When an appellant makes an issue of
refusal to instruct on included offenses,
we will survey the evidence, and the
inferences which admit of rational
deduction, to determine if there exists
reasonable basis upon which a conviction
of the lesser offense could rest.
Id. at 176.
287

Accord:

State v. Close, 28 Utah 2d 144, 499 P.2d

(1972); State v. McCarthy,

25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890

(1971).

-11-
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The standard set forth in Utah Code Ann. §
76-1-402 (4)

(1953), as amended, states there has to be a

"rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant
of the offense charged and convicting him of the excluded
offense."
In State v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 102, 396 P.2d 414
(1964), this Court added:
Also, it is generally held, under
ordinary factual situations, that where a
jury finds the defendant guilty of a
greater offense, the giving of an erroneous
instruction on a lesser offense is not
prejudicial.
If the jury were convinced
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendants were guilty of second degree
murder, the failure to spell out in detail the
required intentions for voluntary manslaughter
could not reasonably influence their decision.
Id. at 416. In State v. Ash, 23 Utah 2d 14, 456 P. 2d 154 (1969),
the defendant was convicted of grand larceny of an automobile.
The evidence disclosed that he had left a motel where he was
staying, driving another person 1 s car.

He was subsequently

chased down by a deputy sheriff, who discovered shaving
equipment, underwear, a gun and some gun shells in the car.
On appeal, the defendant alleged error in that the trial
court failed to instruct on the lesser offense of driving
a vehicle without the owner's consent and with intent to
temporarily deprive the owner of possession.

The Court

rejected this contention, stating:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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")_

. • . the defendant could not have been
prejudiced by a failure to have the jury consider
whether his intent was to deprive the owner of the
use of his car temporarily because the court
clearly told the jury to find the defendant not
guilty if they failed to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that he intended to deprive the owner
permanently of the use of the car.
456 P.2d at 155.
Finally, this Court stated in State v. Bell, 563
P.2d 186 (Utah 1977), that:
. . . The trial court should give the
instructions for lesser included offenses
whenever, by any reasonable view of the
evidence, the defendant would be guilty of the
lesser included offense.
The instructions for
included offenses may be properly refused if
the prosecution has met its burden of proof
on the greater offense and there is no
evidence tending to reduce the greater
offense.
563 P.2d at 188.
The Court added a very significant corrunent at
563 P.2d 188:
Whenever this court believes beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error in not giving
the instruction would not have affected the
verdict the case should not be reversed. . . .
The respondent agrees that Utah Code Ann.
41-1-109

§

(1953), as amended, is a lesser included offense

of the theft statutes, Section 76-6-404.

However, the

right to have the jury instructed on the lesser included
offense is not absolute.

Utah Code Ann.

§

76-1-402(4)

states:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The court shall not be obligated to
charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis for
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the
excluded offense. (Emphasis added.)
The facts of this case do not justify an instruction
on the lesser included offense of joyriding.

The evidence

presented by the appellant is inherently suspect and
uncorroborated.

Appellant claims that he had heard

bikes at night before but offers no evidence to corroborate
this.

His claim that he merely intended to go for a ride

at 2:45 a.m. in a vacant lot was also uncorroborated (T.10).
According to
bike for

Covington-there was enough gas to ride the

awhile (T.66).

Yet, appellant was caught

pushing the bike not riding it (T.10).

Appellant does

nothing more than dispute the testimony of Officer Evans
that appellant admitted taking the bike because Mr. Covington
owed him a debt (T.23).
The respondent submits that the appellant should
not benefit merely because he was apprehended quickly.

The

State presented substantial evidence of the defendant's intent.
The jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant had the purpose to permanently deprive Mr.
Covington of his motorcycle.

Therefore, appellant was

not prejudiced by a failure to have the jury consider
whether he intended to temporarily deprive Covington of
his motorcycle.

If there was error in

nn~ "~~T~~~ ~~-
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instruction, it was not prejudicial error because it did
not affect the verdict.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY SUSTAINED THE STATE'S
OBJECTION TO CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MR. COVINGTON.
The right of the trial judge to exclude admissible
evidence is provided for in Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

Rule 45 states:
Except as in these rules otherwise
provided, the judge may in his discretion
exclude evidence if he finds that its
probative value is substantially outweighed
by the risk that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time, or
(b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice or of confusing the issues or of
misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and
harmfully surprise a party who has not had
reasonable opportunity to anticipate that
such evidence would be offered.
The trial court's obligation to control the trial

and to prevent prejudice and waste of time is weighed
against the competing right of confrontation.

Part of the

right of confrontation, which is guaranteed in Article I,
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and in the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, is the right to crossexamine the witness.

The respondent does not take issue with

the proposition that exposure of a witness' motive in testifying
is a significant aspect of cross-examination.

However, the

Rules of Evidence do not preclude a court from restricting
such cross-examination when the concerns expressed in Rule
45 are present.
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In State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978),
this Court examined a defendant's claim that the trial
judge unduly limited cross-examination of the witness'
character.

This Court stated:
The matter of cross-examination and the
extent thereof rests largely in the discretion
of the trial judge, and he will be reversed·
only if he abuses his discretion in a given
case.
Even if an error is made in limiting
cross-examination, i t is not to be reversed
unless it also is prejudicial.

Id. at 1017.

See also:

State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 {Utah

1974); State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386

(Utah 1977).

Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence discusses
further the effect of erroneous exclusion of evidence:
A verdict or finding shall not be set
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based
thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous
exclusion of evidence unless (a) it appears
of record that the proponent of the evidence
either made known the substance of the evidence
in a form and by a method approved by the
judge, or indicated the substance of the
expected evidence by questions indicating the
desired answers, and (b) the court which passes
upon the effect of the error or errors is of the
opinion that the excluded evidence would probably
have had a substantial influence in bringing
about a different verdict or finding.
The Utah Supreme Court in Maestas, supra,
addressed the question of what is prejudicial error, and
made note of State v. Chance, 279 N.C. 643, 185 S.E.2d 227

-16Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(1971), where the court found prejudice lacking because
the mere asking of the question on cross-examination implied
the contention of counsel who asked the question.
Also in Maestas the court cited People v. Winston,
46 Cal.2d 151, 293 P.2d 40 (1956).

In Winston, the trial

judge refused to allow questions of witnesses as to whether
they had been promised leniency from the police in return
for their testimonies.

This was found to be error but not

prejudicial error because the jury was aware that the
witnesses had broken the law and were under the supervision
of the juvenile authorities.
In People v. Bliss, 76 Ill.2d 232, 222 N.E.2d 57

(1966),

the witness for the prosecution had disclosed that a charge
against her for possession of narcotics had been dropped.
Defense counsel continued on cross-examination to further
inquire as to promises by police to dismiss such charges.

The

court sustained objections to further questions on crossexamination as being repetitious and superfluous.

This was

held not to be improper limiting of cross-examination.
In the instant case, Mr. Covington admitted he
was arrested in a criminal investigation (T.44).

The defense

asked him if Officer Evans had taken him to jail in connectionwiththis investigation (T.37), and further elicited testimoi
that Officer Evans had discussed Covington's testying in the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

instant case

(T.42).

him how to testify,

Covington stated that no one told
Evans merely advised him that if he did

not tell the truth, he woul~ go to jail

(T.40,42).

Through these questions the jury was aware that
Mr. Covington had been arrested by Officer Evans in
connection with a separate, criminal investigation.
The issue whether Mr. Covington may have had a motive
in testifying was before the jury.

Mr. Covington

testified no one told him how to testify.

Further

inquiries would have been speculative and repetitious.
The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its
discretion.
CONCLUSION
The corpus delecti of the crime was made out by
clear and convincing evidence independent of the appellant's
a&uissions.

The evidence showed there was an unlawful

asportation of the motorcycle and it showed someone was
criminally responsible.

The appellant's intent, in taking the

motorcycle, can be determined from what he said and did.
From the circumstances surrounding the theft and from the
appellant's admission to Officer Evans, the jury could
conclude the appellant had the intent to permanently deprive
the owner of the motorcycle.

The appellant has not shown

that the evidence was so inconclusive that reasonable minds
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could not reasonably believe he had the intent to permanently
deprive the owner.
The trial court properly refused to instruct
the jury on the lesser included offense of joyriding.

The evidence presented by the appellant to negate

the theory he intended to permanently deprive the owner
of the motorcycle was inherently suspect and uncorroborated.
Even if there was error in not giving the instruction on
the lesser included offense it would not have affected the
verdict.
This verdict should not be set aside by reason
of the erroneous exclusion of evidence, because the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in limiting crossexamination.

The fact that Mr. Covington was being

investigated by Officer Evans was before the jury.

Also,

Mr. Covington said no one told him how to testify.

Further

questioning would have been repetitious.
Respondent asserts the rulings of the lower courts
were proper and prays the jury verdict and court sentence
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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